



Religion and Science in China: 
Moving Beyond the “Two Cultures” Problem* 
Introduction from the Guest Editor 
Michael Stanley-Baker 
The history of science focuses our view on how early practitioners 
observed, recorded and understood the natural world. As such, it has long 
excluded or deprioritised the religious—the realm of gods, ghosts and 
divine beings, the search for salvation, and speculation about divine origins 
and structures of the universe. This despite the fact that, in pre-modern 
times, these domains were rarely if ever purely separated, or where they 
were, this occurred in inconsistent ways, with such varied contours, that  
it is problematic to talk of any kind of universally applied, consistent 
demarcation criteria. Recently, new approaches from the history of 
knowledge, and the Multiple Secularities project (https://www.multiple-
secularities.de/), have opened the way for synoptic comparisons which do 
not prejudice or privilege the epistemic standing, or even the strict demar-
cation between science and religion from outside the European region. 
This question has occupied sinologists in successive waves. Feng 
Youlan 馮 友 蘭  (1895-1990) argued that Buddhism and Daoism were 
‘natural’ philosophies that advocated following inherent laws in the 
universe, and deemphasised human intervention in the world, and that 
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therefore they muted and suppressed the drive to scientific discovery.1 By 
contrast, Joseph Needham (1900-1995) argued that Daoism (here referring 
to the philosophical strands) in particular sought to understand nature in 
itself, and was the most conducive to scientific thinking among Chinese 
intellectual movements. 2  More recently, Nathan Sivin brought greater 
attention to the historical and social organisation of Daoists, and argued 
that their technical acumen had no necessary connection with scientific 
inquiry, and that the collection of technical knowledge in the Daoist canon 
had more to do with bibliographic habits than experimental praxis.3  
Sivin sought to further disprove this connection in a study which 
reviewed the variety of terms used to refer to Daoists and their colleagues.4 
This study selected a wide array of noted ‘scientists’ in Chinese history, 
thirty-nine in total, and, assessing their ‘Daoist’ qualifications, identified 
only three figures as Daoist. (Notably, all of these were active in medicine, 
which poses interesting questions about the status of medicine with 
relation to Chinese religions.)5 He concluded that ‘Daoism’ as an ideology 
has no intrinsic relationship to the production of scientific knowledge. 
Although individual Daoists, whether philosophical or religious, may be 
found to be active in scientific practice, there is no reason to call science 
‘Daoist.’  
Timothy Barrett and Alexeï Volkov, separately responded to Sivin’s 
article, calling out for more complex characterisations of the individuals 
and their relationship to Daoism than allowed for in Sivin’s list.6 Volkov 
mounted a pointed critique of Sivin’s article, through a close argument 
about the close relationship between Zhao Youqin’s 趙友欽  (b. 1271-
d. 1331-1335) mathematical work and his inner alchemical practice. 
Arguing from evidence of Zhao and other figures that Sivin’s survey was 
not representative and required more nuance with regard to individuals 
discussed in it, Volkov pointed out that the list of individuals that Sivin 
relied on for his bibliography had its own biases and constraints. Barrett 
also pointed out that not only was the relationship of the three Daoists 
mentioned by Sivin to the religion more complex than allowed for in 
Sivin’s survey: Daoism itself needed more nuanced characterisation than 
was given in Sivin’s paper. He concluded, with reference to Ho Peng 
Yoke’s argument, that while it is wise to move beyond Needham’s 
idealised representation of Daoism, this should not lead us to assume that 
                                                            
1 Fung (1922). See discussion in Raphals (2017). 
2 Needham and Wang (1956), pp. 33-164. 
3 Sivin (1968) and (1978). 
4 Sivin (1995). 
5 Others have since identified a fourth medical author, Yi Xing 一行 (682/683-
727 CE) as having also annotated Daoist texts; see Volkov (1996-1997); Barrett (1998). 
6 Volkov (1996-1997); Barrett (1998). 
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there existed something like a ‘two cultures’ distinction between the 
humanities and the sciences in China.7 Both Volkov and Barrett agree that 
the data gathered by Sivin was not conclusive and that further close study 
was required. However, they agreed with Sivin, who in his article 
advocated a ‘third history,’ one no longer occluded by ideological framings 
which imagine specific ‘isms’ being bound to science. 
Notably, Sivin later came to refer to a ‘two cultures’ problem, but one 
that took shape in the choice of late twentieth century sinologists to read 
only texts that they deemed reader-friendly rather than in writings from 
imperial China. In coining the term ‘Awesome Taboo’ he referred to this 
generation’s habit of avoiding early scientific texts unless actively 
researching the history of science.8 While Sivin did not explicitly refer to 
the ‘two cultures’ notion, it is implicit in his critique that in his view what 
lay behind sinologists’ tacit notions of what was acceptable or accessible 
historical material exhibited influence of a modern demarcation question, 
whereas early polymaths made no such distinctions. 
More recent research has sought to unpack and explore what, for mod-
ern readers, constitutes the blended epistemologies of early practitioners. 
While many studies of Buddhist and Daoist technical practice have been 
produced, perhaps Jiang Sheng‘s 姜生 project on the history of Daoist 
science and technology, based in Shandong University, Jinan, has been the 
most conspicuous response to Sivin and Needham. Involving a broad host 
of scholars from within China, and also some from Taiwan, Japan and the 
United States, the project as developed in two volumes seeks to define an 
intrinsic relationship between Daoism and science.9 Drawing on Volkov’s 
refutation of Sivin, Jiang Sheng argues that the close enmeshment of 
spiritual cultivation and the desire to know more about the world within 
and the world around is part of Daoism’s special characteristics that have 
made it so productive of technical knowledge.10 He does not directly 
address Sivin’s point that Daoists did not produce knowledge, and that 
they merely used knowledge that other experts produced, as would tech-
nicians. Instead, he argues that Sivin’s notion of science is an impractical, 
unrealisable ideal—since even the ‘Daoist’ identities of Ge Hong 葛洪 
(c. 283-343 or 364) and Tao Hongjing 陶弘景 (456-536) are ambiguous and 
hard to determine. Rather, Jiang Sheng maintains, attention needs to be 
paid to what he describes as ‘East Asian science.’ Much scientific discovery 
was derived as a combined effort of Daoist ‘philosophers’ (daojia 道家), 
Daoist ‘religionists’ (daoshi 道士) and technical masters (fangshi 方士), who, 
                                                            
7 Ho (1987). 
8 Sivin (2010) and (2007). For a first instance, see Sivin (2000). 
9 Jiang and Tang (2002) and (2010). 
10 Jiang and Tang (2002), p. 8 
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he argues, shared a common interest in the natural world. Unfortunately, 
Jiang Sheng’s work resorts back in many ways to Needham’s earlier claims, 
and spends many pages repeating similar claims that ‘Daoism’ writ large, 
is responsible for so many scientific discoveries, often without qualifying 
what kind of ‘Daoism’ is being referred to in any given instance, beyond a 
rather blunt and imprecise distinction between daojia (’philosophy’) and 
daojiao (‘religion’). 
English-language scholarship has been slow to acknowledge Jiang 
Sheng’s project. The ‘two cultures’ or ‘Awesome Taboo’ problem continues 
to be reified to some extent in recent writings in English on Daoist philos-
ophy and science, by drawing on early twentieth century translations of 
Chinese categorical terms as consistent and reliable knowledge domains, 
with no reference to Jiang Sheng’s attempts to override them. Recent 
articles in this field have seen fit to argue that an indigenous categorical 
distinction between daojiao and daojia is germane to a Western distinction 
between Daoist “religion” and “philosophy.” 11 These arguments confine 
the activity of daojia to the pre-Han and Han period (up to 220 CE), and 
daojiao to the ensuing period, preferring to leave the relations between 
science and daojiao uncommented on. While this strategy is useful for 
constructing a Sino-centric analogue to the centuries-long field of European 
science and philosophy, it leaves open to question whether the distinctions 
between daojiao and daojiao are directly analogous to the distinction 
between philosophy and religion.  
Schipper and Verellen argue in contrast that the term daojia only came 
into use in the Western Han period (206 BCE-9 CE), at about the time the 
term huanglao 黃老 fell into disuse, as if the former had replaced the latter, 
and that the theorisation of daojiao as a contrastive was introduced by Zhu 
Xi 朱熹 (1130-1200), not himself an initiate.12 They note that as the terms are 
used in the Ming dynasty Daoist canon, which contains literature for the 
succeeding 1500 years, the terms daojao and daojia are almost interchange-
able, and that any notion of a hard-lined distinction made by sinologists 
does not apply throughout this period of writing. This is in fact consistent 
with Jiang Sheng’s use, who often interpolates daojiao, daojia and fangshi. 
It is further worth considering whether daojia or daojiao were relevant 
categories to the producers and users of knowledge themselves. In effect, 
daojia is a retroactive category more relevant to bibliographers, librarians, 
and historiographers such as Sima Qian 司馬遷 (145-86 BCE) and Zhu Xi. It 
is unclear whether any historical actors labelled themselves as a daojia or as a 
practitioner of daojiao. Daojia is a moving target, as bibliographers changed 
their ascriptions over time, allocating philosophical and technical works to 
                                                            
11 Liu, He and Wong (2015); Raphals (2015) and (2017). 
12 Schipper and Verellen (2004), p. 6. 
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different categorical schema in different periods. Medicine, for example, is 
included in technical literature in the Han court bibliography, but moved 
to the Masters literature by the Tang dynasty.  
The articles in this issue take up the question of how to better study the 
entangled histories of religious and scientific practice, and result from a 
workshop titled “Science and Religion in Medieval China,” co-organised 
by Dr. Pierce Salguero and myself, and generously hosted by the Abington 
College of Pennsylvania State University on 27 March 2014. Rather than 
defining Daoism, science and religion, and assuming that they were 
concepts and tacit motivations available to historical actors, presenters at 
the workshop were asked to engage ‘science’ and ‘religion’ as retroactive 
heuristic categories. They were invited to compare the scope of these terms 
as they frame the view of modern scholarship, in relation to the ways 
historical actors organised knowledge and practice during their historical 
moment(s). Each of the contributions began from the hypothesis that the 
separation of technical and salvific practice is a distinction coeval with the 
emergence of modernity. They explored the degree to which this separa-
tion is reflected or not in the activities and fundamental assumptions of 
protagonists from the Han 漢  (209 BCE-220 CE) through the Song 宋 
dynasties (960-1279). Drawing on critical perspectives from Chinese 
religious studies, history of medicine, and science and technology studies, 
the contributions investigated the fluidity and interconnection of pre-
modern material and spiritual technologies, the parallels between 
treatments of the body and of the self, and the apprehension of universal 
patterns and the fundamental ground of being. This larger question of  
the conditions and means by which religion is demarcated from other loci 
of society and intellectual activity is a core research question of the Kolleg-
Forschungsgruppe for Multiple Secularities at the University of Leipzig, 
which I joined as a Senior Researcher in 2017, 2018 and 2019. I am grateful 
for their financial support and intellectual inspiration which has 
contributed to the editing of the articles here. Much of the work for my 
initial paper, and subsequent revisions, was undertaken while I was a post-
doctoral researcher of the Berlin Centre for the History of Knowledge, 
based at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science.  
Rather than rehearsing the teleologies from earlier generations of 
historians of Chinese science, which have tended to characterise early 
technical knowledge as ‘precursors’ or as ‘proto-‘ science, these articles 
examined the production of various genres of technical knowledge amidst 
the assumptions, arguments and social networks of their time. They 
foregrounded the ways in which practitioners and their techniques crossed 
borders of intellectual disciplines (modern and pre-modern), geographic 
realms, historic periods, social classes and epistemic habit throughout 
Chinese history. Paper topics ranged from medicine, hygiene, and 
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divination to self-cultivation, transcendence, and esoteric and empirical 
geography, and considered the ways in which these technologies or 
narratives coalesced into formal systems. How did religious ideas shape 
technology, and how did technologies shape religion? Presenters were thus 
invited to consider the dynamics of the formation of religion and scientific 
knowledge, and ways in which techniques were strategically positioned 
vis-à-vis pre-existing knowledge. How did religious actors adopt, adapt, 
deploy and authorise technological methods as part of the formation of 
identity, orthodoxy or technical canon? While some authors, due to tenure-
track pressure and other needs, published elsewhere, three authors 
developed their contributions into the form seen in this volume. They 
discuss three discrete knowledge domains: divination, medicine in relation 
to Daoism, and sacred geography. 
Michael Stanley-Baker considers the utility of the term ‘Daoist medicine’ 
(道教醫學 daojiao yixue) as a term of art, both in modern scholarship and in 
pre-modern sources. In the vein of identifying actors’ categories and 
comparing them to scholarly ones, he demonstrates that the term ‘Daoist 
medicine’ did not exist in Imperial China, and is not found in any primary 
sources. Since the initial draft at the workshop, he has gone on to apply 
digital humanities methods in order to produce more evidence for his 
argument. He reviews the scholarship on Daoist therapeutics, and 
highlights the problems which arise when historians attempt to contrive a 
universal definition of ‘Daoist medicine’ without recognising that it is a 
modern heuristic term and then force ill-fitting material into it. Such 
writing conceals the deep ideological and epistemological rifts that existed 
between different Daoist communities, and encourages scholars to misat-
tribute ‘Daoist’ identities to historical figures with little or no justification. 
He compares these to scholarship which addresses detailed and subtle 
variances in different communities’ attitudes to medicine, which is much 
more successful at representing the ways in which actors navigated their 
time and place.  
Taking all the above into account, Stanley-Baker argues for the eschew-
ing of master narratives, and the need for nuanced situating of knowledge 
in its local contexts. He proposes actor network theory as a methodology, 
and recourse to the ‘infra’—a space of ambiguity and in-betweenness 
where overarching categories are discarded so as to better account for the 
complex, tenuous and ambiguous ways in which knowledge is structured.  
Stephan Kory investigates the emergence, development, and polysemy 
of the term zhanhou 占侯 as it is variously described in a range of sources 
from the late Han through the Tang dynasty, asking how these texts 
instruct earlier diviners, as well as modern scholars, to ‘see.’ He identifies 
the epistemic priorities of the practices, the forms of knowledge transmis-
sion valorised by different authors, and their hierarchical standing in their 
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contemporary milieux. By keeping close to the epistemic terms of his actors, 
Kory demonstrates how Han dynasty courtiers considered such work to be 
knowledge acquired through study and apprenticeship, and how some 
Daoists considered knowledge of such practices to be the result of divine 
inspiration or bestowal of power. While the operation and presence of 
divine or spiritual beings is an assumed cultural background to the practice, 
many divinations were based purely on the observation and interpretation 
of what were perceived to be anomalous manifestations of qi in heaven and 
earth. Kory identifies and elaborates on the many different ways that 
zhanhou was received and used in late Han and medieval times. He 
proposes ‘aeromancy’ or ‘divination based on atmospheric conditions’ as a 
translation for the term when it is used to refer to a discrete mantic 
technique, but he also points out a number of specific occurrences in which 
more literal translations like ‘omen watching,’ ‘mantic observation,’ or 
‘divination based on seasonal conditions’ better capture the meaning of the 
term. Some Buddhists prohibited the practice of zhanhou because although 
it was effective in foretelling events, it was merely an empirical practice 
which blinded one to the wisdom of the Buddha. Some Daoists’ attitudes 
contradicted this; they maintained that even though it was a lowly 
technique, zhanhou nevertheless could lead to higher spiritual practices 
once mastered.  
Kory’s article thus makes a significant contribution to the discussion 
outlined above. He demonstrates that a demarcation problem certainly 
existed, and was deployed in various contexts in different ways. But these 
ways were inconsistent, and context-dependent. The subtlety and detail 
with which Kory treats his topic shows up broad-span notions of science or 
religion as blunt instruments, which are not up to the task of representing 
how actors deployed knowledge in their time and place. 
 Jonathan Pettit argues that Daoist writings about sacred mountains 
were cognate to geographic treatises, and that their organisation of topo-
logical knowledge had value that permeated beyond the aspirations of 
divine transcendence, and into the social and political realm of imperial 
sponsorship. He re-reads Tao Hongjing’s annotations and letters about the 
terrain and inhabitants of the three Mao Mountains as more than just 
descriptive text, but purposive narrative with multiple subtexts. The detail 
with which Daoists observed the geographic terrain around them was not 
just mythography and portrayal of divine underground grotto-heavens. It 
actively constructed a social, economic, political and ritual landscape in the 
imagination of the reader, in this case, Emperor Wu 武 of the Liang 梁 
dynasty (r. 502-549 CE), populating the earth with treasures, the land with 
healing herbs and minerals, and the terrain with people who were 
structured into social hierarchies. In so doing, Pettit breaks up hard-sided 
notions of scientific versus religious writing, and shows how the contours 
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of Daoist geographic knowledge emerged from local topography, social 
landscape, and the aspiring relations of the author with his reader. This 
article thus stands in relation to the writings about spatiality, the state and 
comic power germane to post-colonial histories as well as to, for example, 
South East Asian and Buddhist political geography. Pettit’s perspective 
offers an intimate view on to the geographer himself, and his personal 
aspirations and commitments to the political and cosmic authorities of his 
time. 
These results speak, albeit in partial, rather than summative form, to  
the questions of the Berlin Centre for the History of Knowledge and the 
Leipzig research group. By creating distance from modern or Euro-centric 
concepts of science, and by including a broader swath of data to include 
religious formulations, this inquiry sits within the larger framework of the 
history of knowledge—a perspective which invites the application of cross-
disciplinary methodologies. Thus methods from science and technology 
studies become more clearly germane to the history of religion and vice 
versa. Rather than asking whether ‘their’ science looks and smells like ‘our’ 
science, and if not, whether it deserves the name of ‘science’ at all, scholars 
can attend more closely to the processes and practices of knowledge-
formation within the local context, using methods that may well be, but  
are not necessarily bound to be, familiar to historians of more familiar 
modes of knowledge production. The Leipzig group’s research on 
‘Multiple Secularities’ seeks to compare the contexts and processes by 
which societies across time and space have sought to distinguish the 
religious from the non-religious. 13  Recognising such distinctions are 
contingent, they seek to dive deep into the local conditions and exigencies 
of each kind of demarcation making, and allow for consistency and 
discontinuity in their findings from different cultures and periods.14  
The results of the three articles are consistent: they do not find that the 
knowledge they study from the period of disunity between the Han and 
Sui dynasties form in themselves a consistent demarcation of secular and 
religious knowledge. Practitioners of medicine, divination, or geography 
could be variously oriented—or not—towards salvific aims, the con-
struction of a meaningful cosmos, or concerned with divinities or divine 
                                                            
13  For a definition and working framework of “Multiple Secularity,” see 
Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012). The initial framework defined the production 
of religious-secular boundary making as a response to four main types of societal 
problem: 1) individual freedom versus society; 2) religious heterogeneity; 3) social 
or national integration and development; and 4) institutional independence. 
Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012), p. 887. 
14 Kleine and Wohlrab-Sahr (2016).  
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powers.15 They may have found these practices to be aligned with, aligned 
against, or neutral towards religious aims and worldviews. Any 
demarcation criteria that can be teased out through close reading of the 
texts did not raise the status of ‘dominant [motifs]’ nor did they ‘set the 
basic terms for distinguishing religious and secular spaces in…society.’16 
Kory finds that while divination is marked as a lower form of 
knowledge to Buddhism, it is in some cases rejected, in some cases utilised. 
Some Daoists on the other hand, warmed to it as a gateway practice to 
transcendence. Scholars such as Wang Chong 王充 (27-c. 100 CE) advo-
cated divination as contiguous with a world populated by divine beings 
even while privileging a rationale for it that Wang considered anti-religious, 
or anti-superstitious: namely, qi and the observable patterns of nature. 
Pettit situates Daoist geography as contiguous with more empirical 
geographies, and argues that Tao Hongjing sought to align, rather than 
distinguish, his and the emperor’s interests. As such, the genre that Tao 
employed takes shape as one which does not demarcate the religious from 
the worldly. Nevertheless, demarcations creep in—Tao was keen to 
distinguish his practice from the raucous and unseemly noise of other sects 
in the area, who he would wish to keep away from sacred sites. He also 
privileges knowers of Maoshan’s secrets as having a higher destiny, 
oriented towards better chances of salvation.  
Stanley-Baker takes a methodological approach, surveying the histori-
ography of Daoist healing, and mounting a critique of recent attempts to 
make Daoism and medicine converge which do not attend to the 
epistemological violence that such claims perform. He points out that 
different claims to Daoist identity are contingent to different styles of 
boundary-making, and argues that this variety should be prioritised, with 
less ideological motivation to promote or decry a singular Daoism. 
Taken together, the three articles take the steps called for by Barrett, 
Volkov and Sivin: the study of the entanglement of religion and science, 
without imposing those categories onto the material, but paying close 
attention to the methods and modes by which such knowledge coalesces 
and becomes structured in the discourse(s) of its time. By investigating the 
intersectionality (from a modern perspective on these knowledge domains), 
of divination, medicine and geography, the articles indicate something 
contrary to Sivin’s early argument that religion and science had no intrinsic 
relation in China—indeed they are thickly related, the question is how. In 
contrast to Jiang Sheng’s project, which seeks to provide evidence for an 
overarching, definitive characterisation of an intrinsic relation between 
science and Daoism writ large, they approach the subject through the 
                                                            
15 See Stephen Kory’s conclusion for a tri-partite synopsis of late twentieth 
century scholarly concepts of religion. 
16 Wohlrab-Sahr and Burchardt (2012), p. 888. 
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cumulative building-up of research from detailed examination of source 
data. For each of these contributions, the relationships which emerge are 
not obvious and widespread, but complex and embedded within particular 
arguments. 
Collectively, the authors wish that these samples be taken together as 
part of a long term investigation into the contours of religion and science in 
China, categories whose weight in modern thought makes them 
inescapable, but which need much further clarification as to what they 
mean for the study of China.  
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